The Provisional IRA  [1987]            

 

[Review by Desmond Greaves of  “The Provisional IRA” by Patrick Bishop and Eamon Mallie;  Heinemann, 1987;  in  the November 1987 issue of the “Irish Democrat”]

This is an important book which no student of the past twenty years of Irish history can afford to be without. The authors are two young journalists, the one English, the other from Belfast – one judges from the form of his name Catholic.

They set out to tell the story of the “Provisionals” with the aid of published materials supplemented by copious interviews with participants in their struggle. They understand that “As long as Ireland is divided, violent Republicanism will be an ineradicable tradition.”

It is however a journalists’ not a scholar’s book. The early part is full of historical errors. Students of general Irish history should stick to the standard sources. For example the authors have Wolfe Tone born in Bodenstown instead of Dublin, the first Dáil electing Collins in succession to De Valera, and Anthony Coughlan a member of the IRA, which he never was.

There are many points a  historian would have questioned  that the journalists take on trust. Much of the detail of the early days of the civil rights movement is one-sided. But the writers have attempted to give a fair account, professionally handled, of the verbal information that came their way. It was not their fault that some of the most vital witnesses were no longer with us.

Their general thesis on the origin of the Provisionals seems to be that Cathal Goulding, prompted by Roy Johnston, tried to revive Wolfe Tone’s conception of an Irish nation in which Protestants and Catholics were united by their common interests in political and economic democracy. They regard this conception as flawed. When a final attempt to put it to put it into practice foundered much as the Republican Congress had foundered in the nineteen thirties, history brought into being the Provisional IRA. If it had been possible for the Tone tactic to work there would have been no Provisionals. They offer some sound psychology in support of their views.

But it does not follow, however, that a tactic that failed twice must necessarily fail always. Many were the direct insurrections that failed. Yet people always tried again.

The authors make the justifiable point that it was not NICRA but the mass movement which grew out of it that produced the immediate effects, and they reinforce my own belief that the refusal of “People’s Democracy” to give Terence O’Neill the breathing space to begin the process of reform, was based on deliberate provocation. I have never been able to bring myself to speak to any member of “People’s Democracy” who has not repented of that and other stupendous tactical errors. The Irish people are  entitled to their country without having to fight for it.

It is not possible in a short review to touch on all the points of detail the authors assemble. The implications of Fianna Fail in the foundation of a movement they have since expended so much effort in trying to suppress is of interest, particularly the evidence of Captain John Kelly, who was so shabbily treated afterwards. Then there is the bizarre episode of the “ceasefire”, possibly tolerated because the British Government for a time had too much on his hands. The account of the killing of Lord Mountbatten does not support Mr Enoch Powell’s view that the CIA might have had a hand in it.

Their conclusion? The troubles are likely to go on for the foreseeable future. The Republican tradition will remain as long as there is a British occupation. The last seventeen years have only planted it deeper. It is a fair conclusion. 

C.D.G.